The Swedish suicide bomber - when do political radicals turn to violence?

Since the attempted suicide bombing in Stockholm, Sweden, last weekend, the debate is raging about what the cause of this political violence can be, with too many articles published throughout the Swedish media landscape for me to refer here. Simplified, one can say that there are two basic modes of explanation:

a) the cause is inherent to Islam, or at least radical political Islam. It's a question of a totalitarian ideology that is a threat to all of the Western world, or the world of entrenched democracies (the two are treated as synonymous in this view).

b) the cause is poverty and social exclusion of Muslims, which leads desperate people to commit desperate acts.

Both of these modes of explanation, in my view, contain some interesting ideas, yet both are also very reductionist and the simplifications they present are potentially more harmful than helpful for a more nuanced understanding of the processes that lead certain people to turn to violence and terrorism for political reasons.

For a more sophisticated understanding, I highly recommend reading David Laitin's piece "National revivals and violence" from 1999 (in Bowen, John and Petersen, Roger (eds.) Critical Comparison in Politics and Culture, NY: Cambridge University Press).

In this piece, Laitin uses the comparative method to find the cause for political violence (or the absence thereof) in the Spanish Basque territory, Georgia and the Ukraine. Basque country in Spain is not a poverty stricken area at all. It is, in fact, one of the richer regions of Spain, and yet it saw the rise of ETA, a group that used terrorism for political purposes for decades. This gives us reason to question the notion that poverty itself drives political violence. Yet, other areas of Spain that have also seen political separatism, like Catalonia, did not experience violence to the same extent, but based the separatism on negotation instead. Why?

Two conditions are necessary, Laitin argues. First, there must be a social group, stratum, in which violence is an accepted part of socio-cultural practices. This gives us reason to put some stock into the notion that poverty is a factor, insofar as violence is more commonplace as a way of life in poverty stricken areas, even though it is not poverty in and of itself that is the cause. Secondly, the most likely recruits are those who are predominantly young people and members of local social groups, who rely greatly on norms of honour. The dense rural social structure of Basque territory thus became fertile ground for recruitment.

When a sufficient amount of honour is percieved to have been lost by the members of this group, for whom violence is an accepted social practice, political violence becomes a viable alternative.

This can explain why violent separatism developed in Basque territory and Georgia, but not in the Ukraine, where social network structures had a different character. Going beyond Laitin's study, it also explains why white power groups and extreme left wing groups turn to violence: in both environments, violence is seen as an acceptable political method, and both tend to develop sectarian social structures. Though left wing groups might not discuss their status in terms of loss of "honour", their political marginalization might have the same psycho-sociological effect.

Laitin's study was conducted before 9/11 and he did not address political Islam at all. Still, it could help us understand this phenomenon as well: the root cause should not be sought in the religion writ large, but rather in the types of social networks who create their own interpretations of this, have strong internal bonds of loyalty, weak feelings of loyalty or attachment towards the surrounding society and mobilize themselves around a perception of lost honour or dignity.

If this theory is correct, then an important task for politicians and other social actors is to think about the situation for social capital in areas characterized by strong social exclusion. Is the social capital low or high? Is the social capital primarily bridging - fostering networks between different communities - or bonding - fostering strong loyalty bonds within the group? In areas of low social capital - having weak capacity to mobilize - and when the social capital that does exist is primarily of the bonding kind, it would seem to me that at least one of the preconditions for the rise of political violence is fulfilled.

Stop speaking about "immigrants"?

The discussion on the debate site Newsmill continues, today with a piece by Nima Gholam Ali Pour. He argues that the Swedish discourse has been focused on solutions that assume that immigrants is a homogenous collective that can be integrated through collectivist policy measures, for instance the "Sweden contract" proposed by the conservative party wherein immigrants would promise to follow Swedish laws (as if people residing in Sweden were not obliged to do so anyway). He goes on to state that a fundamental flaw of the discourse is a lack of definition of the term "integration" itself, and this is of course an important observation: if the end goal of a policy has not been properly defined, then how can it ever be achieved?

However, his own piece also lacks clarity in this regard. For instance, he notes that there are many reasons for why "people have not become integrated". The sentence structure itself is quite revealing. The people he is talking about - immigrants - are to "become integrated". By whom? Who is doing the active work? Strictly speaking, integration is a process of negotiation whereby two (or more) bodies, institutions or systems unite, wherein all the concerned parties are subjects and contribute. Agency is available and required for all parties for integration to succeed, otherwise it is probably more appropriate to speak about assmiliation, where one dominant party defines the terms and conditions to which the weaker party has to adjust.

Finally, he reaches goes on to state that Sweden has become divided into "Swedes" and "immigrants"  as a result of the collectivist approaches and policies that lay the burden of adaption on "immigrants", and concludes that it is time to stop speaking about "immigrants". While it is true that terms like "immigrant" can easily become loaded with negative meanings and lead to collectivist treatment of ethnic "others", the solution is hardly to do away with the term itself. This denies the rich and often formative experience that is a part of changing country of residence. I can't see any reason why the people who went through this process should be denied the possibility of drawing upon this experience as they enter public space. Moreover, only in a social context that views difference as something negative can this experience be seen as problematic or even threatening the collective identity of the community.

It seems to me that it would be more prudent to pursue a policy framework where difference is accepted and respected, instead of trying to ban terms like "immigrant" from the public discourse.

Swedish views on integration

The Swedish political right and left have entered into polemics on the debate site Newsmill. Nisha Besara is concerned about the direction the political right seems to be taking, noting that making demands on immigrants to adjust (i.e. assimilate) is becoming increasing acceptable in this camp. Her main concern is that the politics of integration will become a battering ram for dismantling the Swedish welfare state.

This causes Markus Uvell, of the right-wing think tank Timbro, to retort that the political left is more concern with maintaing outdated welfare systems than finding real solutions to integration issues.

Both make some interesting points. Beshara points out that the notion that the majority is always right (and thus immigrants, always in the minority, has to assimilate without any quibbles) is hardly a very liberal stance. This is a good point, but then the political right also consists of many conservatives, for whom this kind of collectivism is hardly incosistent with core ideological commitments.

Uvell's points that the entrenched last-employed-first-laid-off rule does have significance for the exclusion of new arrivals on the labour market (i.e. newcoming immigrants) also has some potency.

Both sides also have one fundamental weakness to their argument, as well. Both discuss immigrants as objects for the, albeit well-meaning, attention of primarily Swedish public actors. In neither the right wing or the left wing discourse are the immigrants entrusted agency or competence of their own.

Indeed, the only policy solution that might address this is the one proposed by then-integration Minister Nyamko Sabuni (replaced after the election by Erik Ullenhag) by in late 2009, where the civil society will get an increased role during the introduction to the labour market. Its outcome will, of course, depend greatly on how it's actually implemented but it is noteworthy that its potential have been quite overlooked in the Swedish public debate, which remains quite state-centred.

A retort to Angela Merkel

The German chancellor recently commented that Multiculturalism had been a failure in Germany. In this piece in the major Canadian daily the Globe and Mail, associate professor Irene Bloemraad rebuffs that claim. She simply argues that Multiculturalism cannot have failed in Germany since the country has never genuinly adopted such policies. She goes on to state that the countries that have been the most multicultural, Canada and Australia, generally also have been the most succesful in terms of rates of naturalization rates and sense of belonging.

This is a very interesting argument. It reminds the reader that multiculturalism consists of fairly particular set of policies that not all countries have adopted to the same extent. This is often forgotten in the public debate, where it is simply assumed that the rhetoric of Multiculturalism (which has been more widely adopted than the actual set of policies) somehow reflect political practices as well. The vagueness of the debate in this regard not doubt facilitates populist clamour for increased assimilatory alternatives, since multiculturalism tends to become a catch-all phrase for any type of policy that is perceived as too generous towards the "others".

Calgary elects a Muslim mayor

Mr Naheed Nenshi was elected Mayor of Calgary last night. The CBC News headline points out that he's the first Muslim mayor of a major Canadian city. In the (linked) webcast Mr Nenshi himself says that people in Canada can wake up and say that in Calgary "...I can be anything", and, indeed, symbolically, his victory is significant in a time when there is so much suspicion directed towards Muslims worldwide. Hopefully, it can contribute to the de-politicization of Islam in Canada. It's also interesting to note that he won in Calgary, rather than Toronto, Vancouver or Montreal, which are the cities that are otherwise most famous for ethnic diversity in Canada....

The Globe and Mail explores Multiculturalism

In a series of video features, the first one available here, the major Canadian Daily discusses Multiculturalism and immigration. It's an interesting talk, and to at least some extent revolves around the same topics noted in previous posts on this blog, i.e. the dilemma of groupism, the problems of discrimination and essentialization and the challenges ahead. For those not familiar with the Canadian debate, it could be an interesting example of the public discourse. For those familiar, some of the questions and answers might contribute to further thought on the subject.

Pay special attention to Mr. Tarek Fatah. In the videos, he claims that Multiculturalism has failed in Canada, and that a shift is necessary towards a focus on race instead of culture. Some of the points he raises seem quite poignant to me, for instance the tendency for dominant groups to consider the most different practices of 'others' as cultural markers, as opposed to "eating ice cream and watching the ball game", which can result in segregation rather than integration. This observation forces us to ask how 'cultural difference' is defined, and who gets to define cultural difference.

Still, I'm not convinced that a shift to a focus on race will be the solution. Culture and ethnic heritage does matter, and the right to self-expression should not be underestimated. I feel that Mr. Fatah in this case builds something of a false dichotomy, where culture and race, which can both become grounds for objectification, discrimination, exclusion, or otherness (whatever you want to call it), somehow stand against each other. Indeed, he uses the modern connotations of race when dismissing that Ukrainians or other groups experienced discrimination when entering Canada in the early 20th century, omitting that Italians, Eastern Europeans and even French were, indeed, discussed in terms of their "racial difference" from the British. "Race", like other markers of identity, is not static.

It seems that Kymlicka's notion of building self-protection rights for individuals which allows them to retain cultural differences while not allowing groups to oppress individual members remains a potent idea. Alas, it was absent in this debate.

Scepticism towards scholars...

On the heels of the nationalist Sweden Democrat party entering the Swedish parliament, issues of immigration and multiculturalism have been given more attention in the press. DN, major Swedish daily, recently published a letter to the editor arguing that "four out of ten" respondents in a survey claim to be sceptical towards researchers and scholars studying matters of ethnic relations and integration. That those who support a populist nationalist party would be sceptical towards such research when it does not support their agenda is hardly very surprising. However, the notion that 40 % of the population (provided that the survey is valid, which I cannot speak to) also is sceptical towards the results of academic research is quite alarming, particularly for those who think that enlightment is the primary means by which to create more understanding, tolerance and respect in society.

At the very least, this might be a reminder that we who engage in this kind of research must devote some time to sharing and explaining the results of our work with a wider audience...

Beyond multiculturalism?

In two recent articles in the Globe and Mail, here and here, it is argued that the term multiculturalism might have outlived its usefulness. In the first, Malik argues that the concept has led to a thinking where people are put in "ethnic boxes" and treated exclusively according to their heritage, reduced simply to being representatives of their ethnic groups. This is critique that is fairly common now, and it's certainly been voiced in Europe as well (as has been stated on this page before), for instance in this piece on the Swedish debate site Newsmill.

The second piece argues that Canada should adopt more rigorous language testing and credentials recognition using the Australian model, which allegedly is smoother (though I have to admit that I have seen no studies on the Australian case). It also states that citizenship entails responsibilities as well as rights.

There are important points made here, but also room for raising some caveats. First, while group-think is all too common in the public (and sometimes even academic) debate, it is worthwhile remembering that Multiculturalism was introduced to counter the strong policies of assimilation that preceeded it. Therefore, any replacement of multiculturalism must include a recognition that a) ethnicity is an important marker of identity for many people and that there should be room in public space to recognize that for each individual, b) that immigration in itself often is a fundamental formative moment in the life of the migrant and that this important experience should not be neglected in the public discourse and, c) that also the dominant "mainstream" population has an ethnicity and that practices informed by this ethnicity (involuntarily) can become discriminatory against minorities.

The risk is that the critique against multiculturalism becomes a backlash, leaving the space open for assimilatory policies. It is interesting, for instance, to note that the Globe and Mail editorial feels that specifically new citizens must informed of citizen obligations, which to some extent implies that this segment of the citizenry cannot be entirely trusted with doing their duties, which leaves a lot of questions open, such as what duties? Immigrants to Canada generally do not vote to a lesser degree than the native born population, and if immigrants lack jobs or are under employed, it might have to do with the Canadian immigration policy, rather than the immigration population, which the editorial itself points out.

If it is time to move beyond multiculturalism, and it might be, then care has to be taken so that the embraced alternative does not result in further alienation of the ethnic "others"...

The assault on Multiculturalism continues

It seems Dilsa Demirbag-Sten has decided to make Multiculturalism her target in the debate on integration in Sweden. In her piece in DN she argues that this "-ism" focuses on differences rather than similarities and thus risks segregating society rather than integrating it. This effect, she goes on, comes from the "isms" way of essentializing immigrants as different from Swedes, forcing them to become group represenatives rather than individuals.

This is almost verbatim the same type of argument that Neil Bissoondath launched against Multiculturalism in Canada about 15 years ago, which should allow Demirbag-Sten, and others interested in the tension of identities to look to Canada to see whether these kinds of fears are actually warranted.

My answer would be: no. Canada might also negotiate identities in public space, but the fears of fragmentation that Demirbag-Sten voices are, as far as I can tell, widely overstated. And there are some problems with her arguments: first of all - what is her alternative? Assimilation? In any given contemporary society today, people of a plurality of ethincities coexist in some fashion, and this is constantly evident in public space, not only in terms of languages and religions that people speak, but even in so trivial things as food. Is the Chinese restaurant on the corner, with the storefront sign in Chinese, a threat to Swedish commonality? While this might seem like a banal example, it does underline that there is more than one ethnicity in Sweden.

I think Demirbag-Sten and others who worry about the potential for individuals to reach their full potential in society should rather be concerned with processes of racialization; Why are immigrants treated as a homogenous group in Swedish public space? Why is an individual reduced to a group identity? And more importantly, why does this group identity obfuscate the capacity and competency of the individual (who might very well be proud over this identity, and don't want to deny it, but might also wants to be seen as more than just that identity)? These are all questions that can be answered by studying how identities are constructed in public space, and how the images of those identities becomes guiding for public policy and political action, and manifests as discrimination, potentially on a structural level.

Attacking Multiculturalism will likely draw attention away from these questions and therefore do more harm than good...

More confusion on Multiculturalism in Sweden

It looks like the backlash trend against multiculturalism in Europe continues, as is evident from these comments Selimovic, a liberal candidate for Parliament. He argues that multiculturalism, as a political ideology, cements identities and encourages differences, leading to extremists becoming seen as the "proper" spokespersons for different ethnic communities (he's actually thinking about Muslims here). Thus, moderate forces are marginalized, he concludes. The critique is very similar to Neil Bissoondath's critique of Canadian multiculturalism in the mid -90s.

But I feel that Selimovic is a series of incorrect assumptions that finally leads him to flawed to conclusions. First of all, the reason that moderate forces within ethnic communities (in this case Muslims) have been marginalized, is not because of multiculturalism as a political ideology, but rather because who the gatekeepers to access to public space are. In this case, we're talking about the Swedish media and the Swedish political parties, both of which are dominated, in the higher echelons, but ethnic Swedish middle class people who know very little about the ethnic communities around them. I would hypothesize that they have invited whomever they think fits their own stereotypes about the ethnic "others", people who can be visibly easily identified as not ethnic Swedes and (preferably) have opinons that also come across as fairly foreign. To what extent such people actually represent the points of view of the people they are supposed to represent is never investigated properly, at least this is my impression.

I'm also kind of curious about how multiculturalism forms a coherent "political ideology". While it is true that many in public space, both politicians, scholars and others, too often engage in essentialist assumptions about identity, there is really nothing in multiculturalism itself that makes this a requirement, as far as I can tell. Rather, it simply recognizes that contemporary societies are ethnically diverse, and that this matters in politics.

I'm also kind of curious about what policy alternative Selimovic and his Liberal party sees to multiculturalism? The article speaks about emphasizing "commonalities, dialogue and expectations", but say little about any practical policies. And why areethnic differences seen as so problematic? They exist, why shouldn't they be acknowledged and accepted?

Forum on integration on Swedish TV

Swedish public service TV gathered experts and politicians for a debate on integration politics the other day. Blogg commentators seem particularly pleased by the statements of Sakime Madon, who is regarded as an expert on the field by many. She criticizes what she lables "identity politics" - i.e. the tendency for Swedish governments to devote special attention and programmes to interventions targeted at immigrants specifically and even argues that they do more harm than good by singling out immigrants as particularly helpless.

While some of her arguments are sound - the programmes have indeed had little effect - her analysis still falls short in some respects. For instance, she fails to recognize that long-term unemployed immigrants do often face more barriers to employment than the average unemployed person would. Indeed, it is an inescapable fact that the Swedish labour market, like in so many other entrenched democracies, is strongly ethnically segmented, where clearly the most racialized minorities are to be found at the bottom of the socio-economic hierarcy (in Sweden, this will often be Somalis). Instead of getting hung up on the percieved evils of identity-politics (critiquing identity politics and multiculturalism seems quite fashionable in Sweden now), maybe experts should ask themselves why these quite substantial government programmes have failed....

On a brighter note, Pernilla Ouis writes an quite sound analysis of the typical ideological pitfalls in the Swedish political debate on islam in all ideological camps.

Heartwarming Canadian multicultualism

I'm watching the opening ceremony of the Olympics, and the speaker just told a heartwarming story of Canadian multiculturalism. Apparently, the Indian Olympic team wasn't particularly well funded, and when the Indian community of Vancouver, some 300 000 strong, heard about this, they pitched in and raised funds to provide the team with new uniforms, coaching etc. Or so the story went. I did bring a smile to my face...

Debate on multiculturalism in Sweden

A court verdict giving a Muslim man a $ 10 000 compensation for having been subjected to discrimination is stirring up a lot of controversy in Sweden. If I understand the verdict correctly, he was given this recompensation because the Swedish Public Employment Service cancelled his Employment Insurance, EI, when he refused to great a female manager with an employer that was offering an internship for him with a handshake.

What is so disconcerning is that most commentators seem to believe that the scandal of the situation is that he was given the componsation at all by the court, seeing as he had refused to shake hand with a woman - which itself can be seen as offensive treatment of the woman in question. The problem is that, to my knowledge, that is not what the court has been discussing. Even if we accept that his refusing to shake hand with a woman is insulting to that woman, the problem was that the Public Employment Service cancelled his EI on this ground. By this rationale, the Employment Service is in its right when it cancels EI on the grounds that the client acts in a socially inacceptable manner, and that seems rather different than cancelling the EI on the grounds that the client is refusing to accept an internship position.

The kneejerk reaction of most commentators, which automatically seem to assume that the court was wrong and that it would now be acceptable to discriminate women and get paid for it, is also deeply troublesome, and often involve some hyperbole. Indeed Kjöller's editorial is one of the few more nuanced pieces so far. It bears witness to the state of the Swedish public discourse, in which "the other" is automatically the one to blame. One commentator have even used it to question multiculturalist policies in general. That's the second time in a very short span of time that such policies are coming under fire. If this continues, will we see the same renaissance for assimilationist policies that we have seen in other European countries with backlashes against multiculturalism?

Been published...

On the Swedish debate site newsmilll. It's a piece summarizing the Canadian public and scholarly debate on multiculturalism for Swedish readers (so it's only available in Swedish, I'm afraid)...

The debate on collective rights continues....

Now, it is Halldorf, Ph.D. Candidate in theology at the University of Uppsala, who chimes in. He argues that the majority culture can be in the wrong and that it is important to remember that dominant points of view are not neutral just because they are dominant. This is, of course, quite correct, and a welcome reminder in the debate. It is also key to understand how ethno-centrism can shape the public discourse, and it is only when this is recognized that such phenomena can be properly taken into account.

Debate on collective rights in Sweden

A new doctoral dissertation is sparking a new debate on collective vs. individual rights in Sweden. The dissertation itself, Sayed "Islam och arvsrätt i det mångkulturella Sverige" [approximately "Islam and inheritance rights in multicultural Sweden", my translation], shortly argues that the cultural background of those who stand to inherit should be taken into account in the legal practices that governs the process, which in some cases could mean that a person with multiple citizenships should be able to refer to the laws of the other country. At least, that's how I've come to understand the argument, but I haven't read the thesis, so this is really my account of what others have said about it.

Anyway, the notion that some groups, notably Muslims, should be given the opportunity to inherit according to Shariah law has not been welcomed. One notable critic is Dilsa Demirbag-sten, a reputable journalist and commentator on matters of immigrant integration in the country. She writes that this is another example of how multiculturalism undermines democracy by effectively priviledging special groups with special rights based on identity politics. She considers identity politics the new political platform of the left, and as ostensibly raises group rights over individual rights, she warns that the basic liberal platform of democracy is in peril. Multiculturalism, in her reading, has been co-opted by a collectivist political elite and as a result, individuals within the minorities that are granted special group rights run the risk of oppression. In this case, she is thinking specifically about women.

Her piece reflects several conundrums that contemporary democracies face, namely the inherent difficulties in dealing with individual rights and group rights. Unfortunately, her article also reflects the conceptual confusion that prevails in this debate, in Sweden and elsewhere. This issue has also been discussed in Canada, particularly during the late 90s, and often informed by the same concern - can a multiculturalism that recognizes group rights be reconciled with the principle that all individuals are equal?

Will Kymlicka provides an interesting answer and separates group rights that are internally restrictive (and thus limits the power of individuals within the group) from group rights that provide external protection (from majority discrimination). The latter, he argues, is clearly possible to adopt within a liberal framework, while the former is not. I believe that the public debate on these issues would benefit greatly from this kind of clarification, both in Sweden and elsewhere. Demirbag-sten's piece, by comparison, comes across as rather sweeping, precisely because it lacks precision in terms of the plurality of forms that group rights can take.

More seriously, however, Demirbag-sten’s piece comes across as a frontal assault on multiculturalism as a political framework, carelessly labeling as some form of leftist collectivist project. The problem with this is that most contemporary democracies are poly-ethnic and so needs to find some way to negotiate between majority and minorities. However, in most cases where multiculturalism has been derided as a detrimental elitist project (along the same line of reason as Demirbag-sten engages in), the result has been a backlash of assimilationist policies, as have been seen in the Netherlands, France and Denmark. I doubt that this is where the author wants to go with her piece, but it is, in this respect, dangerous grounds she treads. Multiculturalism is broader than the vision of a single political clique, but if the term itself becomes too negatively loaded, there is a real risk that the reality of a poly-ethnic society itself will come under attack, and that would be a tragedy. Instead, it would be wiser, I think, to discuss how the multicultural society should manifest, and how the dialogue between majority and minorities should be conducted to be as inclusive and respectful as possible. That would, ultimately, be more constructive for the public debate.