Here comes a quite belated, but maybe more exhaustive, comparison on the two debates on what it should take to become a citizen that have been unfolding in the two countries that I am most heavily involved with - Sweden and Canada - during the past months. In Sweden, the debate centered on the proposal by the Minister of Integration, Nyamko Sabuni, to introduce citizenship classes for those who aspire to become citizens. This suggestion was later defeated by a vote on the Liberal Party convention, effectively stopping the Minister from implementing it. In Canada, the debate is a result of the new citizenship guide introduced by the Conservative government. There are interesting similarities between the two debates, but also some important differences that are noteworthy.
In Sweden, the idea of a citizenship course was first publicly discussed by the minister in an article in late March of this year. Here, Sabuni mentions that the course should both "inform about how the Swedish society works, what rights [a citizen] has, but also explain and inform about responsibilities" as well as include "a discussion about the value ground society is based on." Over time, it was the latter component that became the focus of the debate, addressed repeatedly in the media, mostly because critics wondered what "Swedish values" actually consist of. At these occaisions, the Minister tended to frame it in terms of respect of for democracy and democratic procedures. As many mentioned, this is a highly problematic approach.
On the one hand, there are native born Swedes who are engaged in extreme political movements that express disdain towards democracy, both on the Left and on the Right, but the idea that these movements or expressions of opinion would be outlawed in anyway seems quite foreign to the Swedish public discourse because of how freedom of speech is framed in this context. This makes it very questionable to argue that immigrants in some fashion should be limited in this regard, however problematic their potential involvement in anti-democratic movements might actually be. In that sense, there is a hint of the Islamophobic atmosphere to this discourse in the sense that immigrants are, once more, framed as a problem in some fashion, this time insofar as they might be seen as undermining democracy, which understates the extent to which immigrants, particularly refugees, are actually migrating to get away from dictatorships and highly conscious about the freedoms that are available in democracies. It could, of course, be argued the precise practicalities that are involved in the manifestations of a particular nation's democratic procedures are probably unknown to newcomers, but this is probably true for all new citizens at least to some extent, regardless of whether they come from dictatorships or democracies. For instance, I have no idea about what I should actually do when I enter a Canadian polling station the first time, even though I grew up in a democracy, since Swedish voting procecures are arguably different from the Westminster model.
But on a larger level, this debate has been remarkably similar to the ones taking place in Great Britain and other European nations. There, too, the debate seems to be centred on issues of common values and social cohesion tends to be framed in this way. But when it comes down to how such courses would manifest, the advocates tend to end up with general statements about the importance about democracy and human rights, referring sometimes to European human rights codes, and these are, of course, not anything that is particular to British values, as opposed to French or Swedish. In this sense, I'd argue that it probably was a good thing that the proposal was defeated - as it stood, it was simply to vague in terms of content to be productive in any significant way, and it might even have become counter-productive, as it risked becaming another symbol of how the immigrants somehow are "deficient" and in need of "adjustments" in some fashion to properly fit in. In that context, I'd have to argue the Swedish have been generally very passive with regards to suggestions for how discrimination and such obstacles to integration that could be seen as originating in Swedish mainstream society should be addressed.
What about the Canadian debate, then? Well, the new citizenship guide has been addressed both in the printed media and on TV during the Fall. The similarities with the Swedish discourse are best summerized by Jhappan, who strongly questions some of the formulations about "barbarian" cultural practices in the guide. It is an interesting argument about how "others" might become (possibly unintentionally) ostracized, or even demonized, in such texts, and taken in the context of rising Islamophobia, any author should rightly be cautioned in this respect.
But the differences are more interesting. More questions have been asked about the content with regards to Canadian history and civics. CBC, for instance, discussed if the demands on new citizens with regards to learning history and civics are excessive - could native born Canadians pass the test? This has been asked about the old test, too, by the way. While the question certainly is valid, I'm wondering if it possibly should be reframed in terms of making increased demands on history and civics as part of elementary education in Canadian schools. Indeed, Canadian citizenship guide seems to devote much more space to these subjects, and discussions about common values seem to comprise at most about a page or so (though I have yet to examine it in great detail, please correct me if I'm wrong). In this respect, I have to say that the Canadian way of discussing citizenship seems much more focused on those common points of reference that a newcomer might actually find useful for easier orientation in the new country (i.e. history, both in terms of politics but also scientific landmarks and even sports could be relevant in this regard, as well as civics), and rather less imposing in this regard than a course that would focus only on "democratic values" in the way that seems to have been predominantly proposed in the European debates.
The Canadian guide might still suffer from flaws in many regards, but it seems much less problematic than what has suggested in Sweden, at least as far as processes of otherization are concerned.
And I'll try to keep next post shorter, so thank you very much for bearing with me on this rather lengthy spiel...
Monday, December 7, 2009
Saturday, November 14, 2009
New study on multiculturalism and the welfare state
For some time, there has been a debate among academics on the consequences of multiculturalism in welfare states, where some question if the two are possible to combine. For my own part, I have not seen any evidence that there would be any fundamental problem with uniting them. Now, a new paper by Koopmans is taking this topic on and presenting a new take on this, arguing that there is a problem (thanks to Integrationsbloggen for bringing it to my attention). Essentially, the paper argues that having generous welfare states with highly tolerant multicultural policies result in segregation and is a quantitative study comparing results in eight European countries. This is, to some extent, controversial, since it implies that states should either have highly assimilatory policies or generous welfare state to succeed with immigrant integration, but not both.
There are several issues with this paper. First of all, its categorization of multicultural policies leave much to be wished for, including all sorts of policies that might not have a great impact on labour market positioning (arguably the most important single dimension for integration). For instance, the accessibility of citizenship status can have very limited significance for achieving a job in countries where permanent residence is sufficient for been allowed to work.
A second weakness is the discussion on labour market participation. Koopmans only discusses participation as such. There is thus no discussion at all with regards to potential under-employment and other segregation effects within the labour market which might result from discrimination. So, even if more assimilatory policies might be efficient in forcing immigrants into some kind of job, we cannot tell anything about what types of jobs they will get from this study, meaning that it is quite possible that they are to be found on the lowest rung of the labour market ladder. If this is found to be true, we would have good reason to doubt to what extent integration has actually been achieved (as opposed to assimilation).
Thirdly, the study bases its conceptualization on Esping Andersen's typology of welfare state, but this typology is not without its problems. For instance, it is mostly based on how clients qualify for welfare transfers, which says very little about the efficiency of the active labour market policy in the respective country.
Finally, it is remarkable to see the absence of immigrant agency in the paper's theoritization. There is a whole set of assumptions made about how immigrants will supposedly act in response to generous welfare transfers, for instance, that they will be quite content living on social assistance because it is ostensibly much better than the economic situation in their old country. It seems to me that little of this is substantiated.
Thus, I can't say that I am convinced by the presented argument. It makes a lot of assumptions about a causality it cannot conclusively prove, simply because it has under-theorized what mechanisms actually lie behind integration (as opposed to assimiliation), particularly when it comes to entry into the labour market. For instance, it might be that the nations in the study that shows the lowest labour market participation rates simply have the strongest discriminatory social currents, but we wouldn't know, because this issue has not been sufficiently engaged in the paper. This also demonstrates the limited utility of quantative studies for an issue that is inherently qualitative in nature: statistics can only take us so far, it takes qualitative methods to expose the highly complex processes that goes on behind the numbers.
There are several issues with this paper. First of all, its categorization of multicultural policies leave much to be wished for, including all sorts of policies that might not have a great impact on labour market positioning (arguably the most important single dimension for integration). For instance, the accessibility of citizenship status can have very limited significance for achieving a job in countries where permanent residence is sufficient for been allowed to work.
A second weakness is the discussion on labour market participation. Koopmans only discusses participation as such. There is thus no discussion at all with regards to potential under-employment and other segregation effects within the labour market which might result from discrimination. So, even if more assimilatory policies might be efficient in forcing immigrants into some kind of job, we cannot tell anything about what types of jobs they will get from this study, meaning that it is quite possible that they are to be found on the lowest rung of the labour market ladder. If this is found to be true, we would have good reason to doubt to what extent integration has actually been achieved (as opposed to assimilation).
Thirdly, the study bases its conceptualization on Esping Andersen's typology of welfare state, but this typology is not without its problems. For instance, it is mostly based on how clients qualify for welfare transfers, which says very little about the efficiency of the active labour market policy in the respective country.
Finally, it is remarkable to see the absence of immigrant agency in the paper's theoritization. There is a whole set of assumptions made about how immigrants will supposedly act in response to generous welfare transfers, for instance, that they will be quite content living on social assistance because it is ostensibly much better than the economic situation in their old country. It seems to me that little of this is substantiated.
Thus, I can't say that I am convinced by the presented argument. It makes a lot of assumptions about a causality it cannot conclusively prove, simply because it has under-theorized what mechanisms actually lie behind integration (as opposed to assimiliation), particularly when it comes to entry into the labour market. For instance, it might be that the nations in the study that shows the lowest labour market participation rates simply have the strongest discriminatory social currents, but we wouldn't know, because this issue has not been sufficiently engaged in the paper. This also demonstrates the limited utility of quantative studies for an issue that is inherently qualitative in nature: statistics can only take us so far, it takes qualitative methods to expose the highly complex processes that goes on behind the numbers.
Wednesday, September 23, 2009
More lack of precision in the Swedish debate about Canadian immigration...
Today, Hanne Kjöller reports from a Stockholm seminar hosting Howard Duncan from the Metropolis project. The question is why Canada succeeds why Sweden fails, but for some reason, the mentioned factors do not convince me.
Kjöller starts off by stating that the Canadian immigration system is vastly different from the Swedish, where Canada is much more picky about who it accepts. This is not a very good representation of what's going on. While it is true that refugees are a comparatively small group, it is not true that the rest of the immigrants arrive through the well-known points system. The points, which rewards people for high academic achievements and good linguistic ability, only apply to the highly skilled immigrant stream, but there are two other streams, too. One is the economic class, entrepreneurs that are moving their businesses to Canada when they come to live here. The other is the family class. No points are applied to this category, the only caveat being that the sponsoring family must be able to support the immigrant economically.
Even so, Canadian immigrants are generally highly skilled, but Canada, like Sweden, still does have a discussion about the problem with the fabled doctor cab-driver (though in my experience, occupations that require certification of some kind tend to be more generally problematic to enter for immigrants than others). It could also be noted that the Canadian debate often discusses to what extent the points system itself is too focused on letting academics in, when there is a serious skills shortage also in trades and crafts that is not addressed in the current points system. Calls have been made to reform it to allow a greater diversity of skilled immigrants to enter the country, but so far, there has been no real attempts by the government to address the issue.
Secondly, it's a myth that Swedish immigrants are all illiterate (and while Kjöller might not making this assertion, it certainly sounds like she thinks that the Swedish immigrants are much lower educated than their Canadian counterparts). Studies from the early 00s show clearly that academics are overrepresented among Swedish immigrants. Indeed, Swedish immigrant academics have been under-employed and unemployed to a higher degree than native Swedes ever since the mid 80s, according to an old SACO report from the early 90s. So the problem has persisted since a time when Sweden boasted practically full employment.
Thirdly, Canadians, and particularly researchers at the Metropolis Project, are quite worried about the socioeconomic development of immigrants there. It used to be like Duncan says, that immigrants economically catch up with native born Canadians after a few years in the country. Since the early 90s, though, that catch up time has become longer and longer, and some are started to worry that some groups of immigrants might not catch up at all anymore. This makes we ask why Duncan would say that this is no problem in Canada.
Fourthy, to say that there is no controversy about multiculturalism in Canada is patently false. The policy has been increasingly questioned during the last decade or so.
Still, even with all those caveats, Canadian immigrants are much less socioeconomically challenged than Swedish immigrants are. But given that academics are overrepresented in both groups, I have to ask if the educational levels in the immigrant population can adequately answer the question of why Sweden seems to lag behind Canada with regards to immigrants' economic integration.
Kjöller starts off by stating that the Canadian immigration system is vastly different from the Swedish, where Canada is much more picky about who it accepts. This is not a very good representation of what's going on. While it is true that refugees are a comparatively small group, it is not true that the rest of the immigrants arrive through the well-known points system. The points, which rewards people for high academic achievements and good linguistic ability, only apply to the highly skilled immigrant stream, but there are two other streams, too. One is the economic class, entrepreneurs that are moving their businesses to Canada when they come to live here. The other is the family class. No points are applied to this category, the only caveat being that the sponsoring family must be able to support the immigrant economically.
Even so, Canadian immigrants are generally highly skilled, but Canada, like Sweden, still does have a discussion about the problem with the fabled doctor cab-driver (though in my experience, occupations that require certification of some kind tend to be more generally problematic to enter for immigrants than others). It could also be noted that the Canadian debate often discusses to what extent the points system itself is too focused on letting academics in, when there is a serious skills shortage also in trades and crafts that is not addressed in the current points system. Calls have been made to reform it to allow a greater diversity of skilled immigrants to enter the country, but so far, there has been no real attempts by the government to address the issue.
Secondly, it's a myth that Swedish immigrants are all illiterate (and while Kjöller might not making this assertion, it certainly sounds like she thinks that the Swedish immigrants are much lower educated than their Canadian counterparts). Studies from the early 00s show clearly that academics are overrepresented among Swedish immigrants. Indeed, Swedish immigrant academics have been under-employed and unemployed to a higher degree than native Swedes ever since the mid 80s, according to an old SACO report from the early 90s. So the problem has persisted since a time when Sweden boasted practically full employment.
Thirdly, Canadians, and particularly researchers at the Metropolis Project, are quite worried about the socioeconomic development of immigrants there. It used to be like Duncan says, that immigrants economically catch up with native born Canadians after a few years in the country. Since the early 90s, though, that catch up time has become longer and longer, and some are started to worry that some groups of immigrants might not catch up at all anymore. This makes we ask why Duncan would say that this is no problem in Canada.
Fourthy, to say that there is no controversy about multiculturalism in Canada is patently false. The policy has been increasingly questioned during the last decade or so.
Still, even with all those caveats, Canadian immigrants are much less socioeconomically challenged than Swedish immigrants are. But given that academics are overrepresented in both groups, I have to ask if the educational levels in the immigrant population can adequately answer the question of why Sweden seems to lag behind Canada with regards to immigrants' economic integration.
Saturday, September 19, 2009
The debate continues
The Integration blogg links to this debate (at 4.30) between Integration Minister Sabuni and the representative of the opposition. "Why does the integration policy fail?", the reporter asks before going on to talk about the riotiing in Swedish suburbs that have been given a lot of attention for the past year or so. I ask myself if that question can ever be adequately answered without looking at mechanisms of empowerment and disempowerment. In that context, a key issue is to look at the civil society of immigrant communities. If I were to guess why this is never really given any attention over there, I'd link this to the Swedish political reflex of solving everything through the powerful welfare state, or the "strong society" as it is known over there. The problem with that, though, is that one size does not fit all, and one type of organizations cannot solve all types of social problem.
Friday, September 11, 2009
New Integration policy launched in Sweden
Today, the Integration Minister of Sweden, Nyamko Sabuni, presented the proposed Bill for a integration policy in Sweden. It states that the goverment will invest SEK 920 million (roughly CAD 150 million) for this policy and details a number of new measures to facilitate a quicker economic integration of immigrants in the country. The most important changes include giving the Swedish Public Employment Service the overall responsibility for the integration process, a new settlement action plan (my rough translation) drafted for the individual immigrant, and a settlement pilot will be assigned to guide the immigrant to the new labour market, as well as increased efforts to teach the newcomers basic civics about Swedish society.
From my perspective, I'd have to say that the only really promising part of this package is the addition of the new settlement pilot. This can be non-state actors (private companies or ngo:s), and if I understand the proposal correclty, the immigrant will be free to chose this guide freely. That would certainly be a step in the right direction. However, the funding system gives cause for pause, as it were. Guides will be remunerated according to how fast they can arrange employment for their clients. This will undoubtedly lead to "creaming" (as it already did in Canada), where agencies will a) only help those who can be quickly placed in work and b) place them in whatever work is quickly available, regardless of the competency of the individual. While it is important for immigrants to find work, the system will not solve the issue of under-employment, i.e. the fabled engineer/doctor who drives a taxi cab.
As for the Swedish Public Employment Service as the main coordinator, I really cannot say how great effect this move will have. On the one side, it is true that coordination of the efforts of government agencies have been severly lacking. On the other side, there is plenty of evidence indicating that the Swedish Public Employment Service has a tradition of paternalism vis-a-vis its immigrant clients, so it seems to me that its competence in this regard can be questioned. On that note, it is unclear to what extent the new individualist "settlement plans" will differ from the similiarly individual introdution plans that municipalities were obligated to draft when receiving immigrants, plans have been around for almost 20 years with very little effect (they are also comparable to the individual action plans for long term unemployed - a quantitative measure with absolutely no impact for employability whatsoever).
Finally, even if this plan, insofar as the settlement guides might succeed where government agencies have failed, might do something for the quicker economic integration of immigrants, one has to ask if the government has any plans for those immigrants are among the permanent unemployed and under-employed and who have been in the country for 10 years and more. In that sense, Swedish integration policy is still focused so much on newcomers that it tends to be blind for the barriers that persist for immigrants with longer residency in the country...
From my perspective, I'd have to say that the only really promising part of this package is the addition of the new settlement pilot. This can be non-state actors (private companies or ngo:s), and if I understand the proposal correclty, the immigrant will be free to chose this guide freely. That would certainly be a step in the right direction. However, the funding system gives cause for pause, as it were. Guides will be remunerated according to how fast they can arrange employment for their clients. This will undoubtedly lead to "creaming" (as it already did in Canada), where agencies will a) only help those who can be quickly placed in work and b) place them in whatever work is quickly available, regardless of the competency of the individual. While it is important for immigrants to find work, the system will not solve the issue of under-employment, i.e. the fabled engineer/doctor who drives a taxi cab.
As for the Swedish Public Employment Service as the main coordinator, I really cannot say how great effect this move will have. On the one side, it is true that coordination of the efforts of government agencies have been severly lacking. On the other side, there is plenty of evidence indicating that the Swedish Public Employment Service has a tradition of paternalism vis-a-vis its immigrant clients, so it seems to me that its competence in this regard can be questioned. On that note, it is unclear to what extent the new individualist "settlement plans" will differ from the similiarly individual introdution plans that municipalities were obligated to draft when receiving immigrants, plans have been around for almost 20 years with very little effect (they are also comparable to the individual action plans for long term unemployed - a quantitative measure with absolutely no impact for employability whatsoever).
Finally, even if this plan, insofar as the settlement guides might succeed where government agencies have failed, might do something for the quicker economic integration of immigrants, one has to ask if the government has any plans for those immigrants are among the permanent unemployed and under-employed and who have been in the country for 10 years and more. In that sense, Swedish integration policy is still focused so much on newcomers that it tends to be blind for the barriers that persist for immigrants with longer residency in the country...
Tuesday, August 25, 2009
Multiculturalism or integration? Why are they seen as oppositional?
In a recent essay in the Globe and Mail, Daniel Stoffman argues that Canadian multiculturalism is more an ideology than a fact. His piece asserts that for having seemingly different official approaches to immigration, Canada (multiculturalism) and the US (melting pot), assimilation rates and political actions come across as remarkably similar. His examples include both countries acting against the cockfighting which some Hispanic communities seem to regard as essential to their culture, as well the debate on Shariah laws.
The piece in interesting insofar as it asks pertinent questions about how multiculturalism is defined, and points out that the term certainly seems to be used in a relatively vague fashion in public space.
Yet, Stoffman seems to conceptualize multiculturalism, and the cultural mosaic it aims to achieve, in a way that is not without problems. Commenting on the Minister's of Citizenship, Immigration and Multiculturalism words concerning integration as the new way to avoid creating isolated ethnic silos, Stoffman concludes:
This dichotomization of multiculturalism and integration seems to assume that cultures somehow are internally homogenous and clearly externally bounded, as well as static, unchanging. This is a very reductionist, even simplistic, view of how cultures actually work. Cultures, it seems to me, are highly dynamic, always changing in contact with others and their borders are seldom easilty drawn. Stoffman's treatment also seems to imply that integration means the radical abandonement cultural plurality, which transforms the concept from one of mutual negotiation between equal parties to one very close to assimilation.
If nothing else, the essay does bring attention to the need to clarify what is actually meant by terms like multiculturalism and integration, which see common usage in the public debate.
The piece in interesting insofar as it asks pertinent questions about how multiculturalism is defined, and points out that the term certainly seems to be used in a relatively vague fashion in public space.
Yet, Stoffman seems to conceptualize multiculturalism, and the cultural mosaic it aims to achieve, in a way that is not without problems. Commenting on the Minister's of Citizenship, Immigration and Multiculturalism words concerning integration as the new way to avoid creating isolated ethnic silos, Stoffman concludes:
"But if we don't want silos, then we don't want to be a mosaic either. Both
images suggest a society composed of separate groups rather than an integrated
whole. If the Minister of Multiculturalism is rejecting silos, he is also
rejecting multiculturalism. Maybe it's time the Department of Multiculturalism
was renamed the Department of Integration. "
This dichotomization of multiculturalism and integration seems to assume that cultures somehow are internally homogenous and clearly externally bounded, as well as static, unchanging. This is a very reductionist, even simplistic, view of how cultures actually work. Cultures, it seems to me, are highly dynamic, always changing in contact with others and their borders are seldom easilty drawn. Stoffman's treatment also seems to imply that integration means the radical abandonement cultural plurality, which transforms the concept from one of mutual negotiation between equal parties to one very close to assimilation.
If nothing else, the essay does bring attention to the need to clarify what is actually meant by terms like multiculturalism and integration, which see common usage in the public debate.
Tuesday, August 4, 2009
Confused Swedes..
Just listened to Swedish radio, which discussed the pros and cons of introducing a language test requirement for immigrants who want to become citizens. Helena Bergholtz, a Liberal MP, said that many succesful nations employ such tests and went on to claim that Canada is a country that uses language tests for such requirements. This is not true. A person who wants to become a Canadian citizen has to pass a test in civics, which probes your knowledge in Canadian history and (to some extent) politics. This is not the same as a language test and the difference is an important one, even if the test itself is written in one of the official languages. It's amazing how persistent this misconception of the Canadian procedure is among Swedes. One would think that someone would check the facts at some point.
It is also discouraging, seeing as accuracy is important when making legislative proposals, particularly in an issue of such significance as citizenship and ethnic integration, where mistakes risks aggravating ethnic relations and cause unnecessary tensions between the majority and the minorities...
It is also discouraging, seeing as accuracy is important when making legislative proposals, particularly in an issue of such significance as citizenship and ethnic integration, where mistakes risks aggravating ethnic relations and cause unnecessary tensions between the majority and the minorities...
Wednesday, July 29, 2009
Canadian developments
Some interesting new developments in the Canadian debate on immigration and integration. Canadian Press has a piece about Kenney's visit to Calgary earlier this month. He says that the federal government's new focus is on integration:
"We don't want to create a bunch of silo communities where kids grow up in a community that more resembles their parents' country of origin than Canada."
He also talks about the dangers of immigrants developing an new identity which would somehow be at odds with their Canadian identity if they lived in such communities.
These comments are somewhat obscure, but ominously echo Bisoondath's critique of multiculturalism from back in the '90s. The real problem is how the Conservative seems to dichotomize between multiculturalism and integration, and between maitaining your cultural heritage and being Canadian. These two will only be at odds if politicized. Indeed, since integration by definition is a process that takes place between two (or more) equal partners in mutual dialogue and negotiation, it seems to me that multiculturalism is a necessity to be able to achieve ethnic integration. Anything else risks leading to assimilation, where the minorities are forced to abandon certain legacies or parts of their identity in the process of becoming Canadians.
The second piece is more recent and discusses how immigrants are hard hit by the recession. What surprised me here is that Canadian employers seem to rely on the last hired, first fired principle. Unlike in Sweden, where it is the law of the land, this rather seems to be a practice of convenience. If anyone could enlighten me further with regards to its status in Canadian working life, I'd be most grateful. But even when the news are these grim, I still have to say that Canada appears relatively succesful in comparison to my native Sweden, because over there, I doubt very much that Mr. Lobana or Mr. Muqtadir would have found any employment in jobs on their own competence level in the first place...
"We don't want to create a bunch of silo communities where kids grow up in a community that more resembles their parents' country of origin than Canada."
He also talks about the dangers of immigrants developing an new identity which would somehow be at odds with their Canadian identity if they lived in such communities.
These comments are somewhat obscure, but ominously echo Bisoondath's critique of multiculturalism from back in the '90s. The real problem is how the Conservative seems to dichotomize between multiculturalism and integration, and between maitaining your cultural heritage and being Canadian. These two will only be at odds if politicized. Indeed, since integration by definition is a process that takes place between two (or more) equal partners in mutual dialogue and negotiation, it seems to me that multiculturalism is a necessity to be able to achieve ethnic integration. Anything else risks leading to assimilation, where the minorities are forced to abandon certain legacies or parts of their identity in the process of becoming Canadians.
The second piece is more recent and discusses how immigrants are hard hit by the recession. What surprised me here is that Canadian employers seem to rely on the last hired, first fired principle. Unlike in Sweden, where it is the law of the land, this rather seems to be a practice of convenience. If anyone could enlighten me further with regards to its status in Canadian working life, I'd be most grateful. But even when the news are these grim, I still have to say that Canada appears relatively succesful in comparison to my native Sweden, because over there, I doubt very much that Mr. Lobana or Mr. Muqtadir would have found any employment in jobs on their own competence level in the first place...
Sunday, July 26, 2009
Rest in peace, professor
It had completely passed my by that one of the truly great philosophers of our time passed away on Friday, July 17 at age 81. Leszek Kolakowski was a Polish thinker whose work Main Currents of Marxism must be seen as one of the most important contributitions to political theory during the 20th century. It constitutes the most thorough and relentless analysis of Marxist thought. Covering the development from the beginnings in the late 18th century to its later incarnations in the 1970s, it clearly exposes fundamental weaknesses in the ideology. In my comprehensive examination paper on comparative politics, I summarized some of his points like this (p. 17):
"My critique is that several central operative terms of these [Marxist] approaches suffers from X-and-Not-X-problems, including ‘human dignity’, ‘higher forms of culture’ and in some cases the use of the term Capitalism itself. Thus the central claim that Capitalism is the historically most dehumanizing mode of production rests on a particular framing of human dignity. This, as Kolakowski argues, can only be substantiated if it has been conceptualized (Kolakowski, 2005, 217). Since this has not been done, the project of its restoration is impeded. The same reservations can be made regarding Marcuse’s higher forms of culture."
In other words, Marx claimed that Capitalism was dehumanizing without ever defining what he meant by human dignity.
The work is a must for anyone interested in political theory in general or Marxism in particular and the significance of this contribution can hardly be over-estimated.
Rest in peace, professor.
P.S. Wolodarski has a good note in Swedish on Kolakowski's contribution here
"My critique is that several central operative terms of these [Marxist] approaches suffers from X-and-Not-X-problems, including ‘human dignity’, ‘higher forms of culture’ and in some cases the use of the term Capitalism itself. Thus the central claim that Capitalism is the historically most dehumanizing mode of production rests on a particular framing of human dignity. This, as Kolakowski argues, can only be substantiated if it has been conceptualized (Kolakowski, 2005, 217). Since this has not been done, the project of its restoration is impeded. The same reservations can be made regarding Marcuse’s higher forms of culture."
In other words, Marx claimed that Capitalism was dehumanizing without ever defining what he meant by human dignity.
The work is a must for anyone interested in political theory in general or Marxism in particular and the significance of this contribution can hardly be over-estimated.
Rest in peace, professor.
P.S. Wolodarski has a good note in Swedish on Kolakowski's contribution here
Monday, July 20, 2009
Extreme right wing gains in Sweden
Swedish public radio discussed the possibility that the extreme right wing populist party The Swedish Democrats might succeed to enter parliament next election (2010). Sweden is traditionally seen as something of an exception in Europe in that such parties just never seem to be very succesful at the polls. An optimistic reading of this history is that Swedes simply are much more tolerant, democratic and respectful to minorities - as indicated by its status as a country with a long history of multiculturalism - which is seen as the explanation for their lack of electoral success. In that respect, it is often compared to Canada, which invented multiculturalism and from this point of view, the growth of a party like the Swedish Democrats must be seen as deeply troubling sign that Sweden is becoming more racist and less tolerant.
However, I have a lingering feeling that this interpretation might be an overly generous reading of Swedish political culture. It seems to me that the cause should rather be sought elsewhere, and I think I would begin my search in the entrenchment of the Social Democratic People's Home, Folkhemmet, and its highly paternalist construction.
Historically, Sweden embraced the nation-state concept vigorously and was one of the countries that chose to pursue eugenics, racial hygenie, with substantial government funding back in the early 1920s. This was not right wing politics back then, but supported by all parties across the political spectrum. I think a fair case could be made that the notion that Sweden has historically been a homogenous nation comes from this time. That notion is, of coures, false. There have always been minorities in Sweden - Finns, Sami, Jews and others, but part of the nation-state policy included the suppression and assimilation of these minorites in the pursuit of "racial purity".
By the end of World War II, "racial hygiene" lost its appeal as a science for obvious reasons. But the Social Democrats were in power, and expanded the centralist Swedish state with the aim of building the People's Home, Folkhemmet. This was a highly hierarchist and paternalist state, based on the notion that enlightened rulers could engineer society to more evolved state, as it was. The Myrdals were very influential in this project, and part of their ambition was to create the "A" Class human. Therefore, eugenics remained as a political tool to "enhance the gene pool" and to "remove degenerative elements" from the popular body. Those "degenerative elements" included the disabled, as well as categories of people who could be argued to have been the Swedish equivalents to "visible minorities" in the Anglo-Saxon world, particularly the Roma and the Travelling People (commonly known as "Tattare" by Swedes). Meanwhile, other minorities, like the Sami, were forbidden to speak their language and express their diversity in public.
Thus, for several decades, the People's Home was not only a Social Democratic project of class equality, it was also a very ethnically Swedish project, and its face embodied features that are characteristic of Swedish ethnicity, complete with blond hair and blue eyes. In that context, I do not consider it very remarkable that right wing populist parties would find it very difficult to win votes. Their potential supporters - working class Swedes - were already highly mobilized by the Social Democrats who were pursuing a political agenda of homogenization, ethnically or otherwise, an agenda that was not challenged until the 1970s with the adoption of multiculturalism (which was adopted, it is interesting to note, when Sweden closed its borders to labour force immigration).
A counter argument would be that other countries also had implemted homogenizing policies. This is true, and the Canadian residential schools for aboriginals are a good example. What I think might be the difference is that the Swedish state has been a highly centralist and paternalist one, with a clearly hierarchical structure (unlike, for instance, the highly fragmented Canadian polity). This has acted as a very powerful conduit for homogenizing policies at the same time as it has effectively obstructed the expression of diversity by the subaltern groups in society. And this pattern persists today, as seen when high Social Democrats, like those leading in Malmö, advocates with such force in favour of restricting the freedom of movement for a particular category of people (immigrants). Moreover, in public space this is seen as a legitimate political tool, notwithstanding its clearly authoritative implications.
Against this history, I can't say that I am surprised that the extreme right wing populists have found a new niche as "defenders of the People's Home" - after all, since the discourse has shifted from one of homogenization towards one of multiculturalism and respect of diversity it is very difficult for mainstream politicians to pursue the old type of policies while at the same time speaking in favour of multiculturalism. The problem is, of course, that they try (as seen in the Malmö example). This creates exactly the kind of contradictions that the right wing extremists thrive in and it is deeply troubling that there is no reason to believe this trend will lose its momentum.
However, I have a lingering feeling that this interpretation might be an overly generous reading of Swedish political culture. It seems to me that the cause should rather be sought elsewhere, and I think I would begin my search in the entrenchment of the Social Democratic People's Home, Folkhemmet, and its highly paternalist construction.
Historically, Sweden embraced the nation-state concept vigorously and was one of the countries that chose to pursue eugenics, racial hygenie, with substantial government funding back in the early 1920s. This was not right wing politics back then, but supported by all parties across the political spectrum. I think a fair case could be made that the notion that Sweden has historically been a homogenous nation comes from this time. That notion is, of coures, false. There have always been minorities in Sweden - Finns, Sami, Jews and others, but part of the nation-state policy included the suppression and assimilation of these minorites in the pursuit of "racial purity".
By the end of World War II, "racial hygiene" lost its appeal as a science for obvious reasons. But the Social Democrats were in power, and expanded the centralist Swedish state with the aim of building the People's Home, Folkhemmet. This was a highly hierarchist and paternalist state, based on the notion that enlightened rulers could engineer society to more evolved state, as it was. The Myrdals were very influential in this project, and part of their ambition was to create the "A" Class human. Therefore, eugenics remained as a political tool to "enhance the gene pool" and to "remove degenerative elements" from the popular body. Those "degenerative elements" included the disabled, as well as categories of people who could be argued to have been the Swedish equivalents to "visible minorities" in the Anglo-Saxon world, particularly the Roma and the Travelling People (commonly known as "Tattare" by Swedes). Meanwhile, other minorities, like the Sami, were forbidden to speak their language and express their diversity in public.
Thus, for several decades, the People's Home was not only a Social Democratic project of class equality, it was also a very ethnically Swedish project, and its face embodied features that are characteristic of Swedish ethnicity, complete with blond hair and blue eyes. In that context, I do not consider it very remarkable that right wing populist parties would find it very difficult to win votes. Their potential supporters - working class Swedes - were already highly mobilized by the Social Democrats who were pursuing a political agenda of homogenization, ethnically or otherwise, an agenda that was not challenged until the 1970s with the adoption of multiculturalism (which was adopted, it is interesting to note, when Sweden closed its borders to labour force immigration).
A counter argument would be that other countries also had implemted homogenizing policies. This is true, and the Canadian residential schools for aboriginals are a good example. What I think might be the difference is that the Swedish state has been a highly centralist and paternalist one, with a clearly hierarchical structure (unlike, for instance, the highly fragmented Canadian polity). This has acted as a very powerful conduit for homogenizing policies at the same time as it has effectively obstructed the expression of diversity by the subaltern groups in society. And this pattern persists today, as seen when high Social Democrats, like those leading in Malmö, advocates with such force in favour of restricting the freedom of movement for a particular category of people (immigrants). Moreover, in public space this is seen as a legitimate political tool, notwithstanding its clearly authoritative implications.
Against this history, I can't say that I am surprised that the extreme right wing populists have found a new niche as "defenders of the People's Home" - after all, since the discourse has shifted from one of homogenization towards one of multiculturalism and respect of diversity it is very difficult for mainstream politicians to pursue the old type of policies while at the same time speaking in favour of multiculturalism. The problem is, of course, that they try (as seen in the Malmö example). This creates exactly the kind of contradictions that the right wing extremists thrive in and it is deeply troubling that there is no reason to believe this trend will lose its momentum.
Thursday, July 9, 2009
Currently watching the quite long video from Fores' presentation of its project on how immigration can be succesfully managed, with cases from the UK, Germany, Canada and Sweden. The whole report is of quite some interest for my work, but this is particularly of the reports from Canada and Sweden. So far, it seems to me that the researchers are looking at this issue with too much focus on systems issues, i.e. to what extent does public policy choices affect outcomes. As often is the case, there is little attention paid to issues of social capital, agency and how the administration of public policy is organized. Still, interesting material for anyone who pays attention these questions...
The role of associations gains unexpected attention
The traditional political seminars in Swedish Almedalen produced an interesting discussion on integration, with panelists Martin Ådahl, Sakine Madon, and well known journalist Maciej Zaremba. The latter has produced the until now best journalistic effort on the quite problematic Swedish immigrant introduction system (the series is available in Swedish only here).
The discussion is the first instance in Swedish public space where people of reknown pay attention to the contributions that civil society actors could provide that I am aware of. The suggestion was made by Ådahl who recommended that the State channel money to civil society actors that can provide introduction services. This is quite welcome, and one can only hope that the Swedish integration debate might be widened to include a discussion beyond the traditional state centred remedies. The question is of course what civil society actors Ådahl has in mind. The big Swedish government oriented associations are already involved to some extent without making much of a difference in terms of empowerment and agency.
Madon's counter-argument, that grants to associations are not working and therefore should not be developed is at best ill informed, as far as I am concerned, at least as far as immigrant associations are concerned. In my experience, it is true that those systems are not particularly impressive, but the problem lies mainly in the system, not with the associations themselves. Or more precisely, many associations do have problems that obstruct their capacity as competent providers of social services, including lack of administrativce experience and even some opportunistic individuals. But the way the system is structured, it dissuades serious actors, who are never given sufficient funds to work on a long term basis, focusing instead on micro grants for short term projects, which to some extent encourages those opportunists.
It will be interesting to see if this discussion made any impact over longer term.
The discussion is the first instance in Swedish public space where people of reknown pay attention to the contributions that civil society actors could provide that I am aware of. The suggestion was made by Ådahl who recommended that the State channel money to civil society actors that can provide introduction services. This is quite welcome, and one can only hope that the Swedish integration debate might be widened to include a discussion beyond the traditional state centred remedies. The question is of course what civil society actors Ådahl has in mind. The big Swedish government oriented associations are already involved to some extent without making much of a difference in terms of empowerment and agency.
Madon's counter-argument, that grants to associations are not working and therefore should not be developed is at best ill informed, as far as I am concerned, at least as far as immigrant associations are concerned. In my experience, it is true that those systems are not particularly impressive, but the problem lies mainly in the system, not with the associations themselves. Or more precisely, many associations do have problems that obstruct their capacity as competent providers of social services, including lack of administrativce experience and even some opportunistic individuals. But the way the system is structured, it dissuades serious actors, who are never given sufficient funds to work on a long term basis, focusing instead on micro grants for short term projects, which to some extent encourages those opportunists.
It will be interesting to see if this discussion made any impact over longer term.
Sunday, July 5, 2009
Paternalism is the problem, not the solution
Today's article in the Swedish major daily DN discusses the unrest in Herrgården in the distrcit Rosengården in the city of Malmö, Sweden. The area is closely follows the pattern that is familiar in discussions about social exclusion and have also grabbed the spotlight in the national media because of the violent outburts of disaffected youth. The article discusses the counter measures taken by the seemingly desperate public decision-makers, primarly in the form of an increased police presence.
What really caught my eye was the suggestions made by Dr Carlbom, anthropoligist. He solution to the segregation is to "...stop the in-migration of immigrants to Malmö." For some reason, he does not agree with the dominant analysis which suggests that uneployment is a prime cause, saying only that he has difficulties seeing that as a cause: "There are many unemployed, but very few who throws rocks".
His solution is highly problematic, though.
While stopping immigration might go some way to address the rise in the rate of overcrowded apartments, a phenomenon that is generally associated with the area, but it will hardly address the reasons for such overcrowding, which, it seems to me must be attributed precisely to the high very unemployment rates that Carlbom discounts as relevant. To put it bluntly, I believe that people don't live in cramped up spaces because it is fun, but because they can't afford anything else.
More importantly, however, stopping immigration is questionable since the measure would constitute a highly paternalist approach to integration. It basically entails adopting the principle that certain people in society (namely immigrants) don't have the freedom of movement that everybody else has. That is, if anything, highly disempowering. If there already is a siege-mentality (and the article certainly suggests this), then it will only be strengthed by such quite draconic measures, further fuelling frustration and antagonistic us vs. them feelings.
It seems to me that in a situation where disempowerment and social exclusion is so prevalent, such paternalist measures will only make things worse.
What really caught my eye was the suggestions made by Dr Carlbom, anthropoligist. He solution to the segregation is to "...stop the in-migration of immigrants to Malmö." For some reason, he does not agree with the dominant analysis which suggests that uneployment is a prime cause, saying only that he has difficulties seeing that as a cause: "There are many unemployed, but very few who throws rocks".
His solution is highly problematic, though.
While stopping immigration might go some way to address the rise in the rate of overcrowded apartments, a phenomenon that is generally associated with the area, but it will hardly address the reasons for such overcrowding, which, it seems to me must be attributed precisely to the high very unemployment rates that Carlbom discounts as relevant. To put it bluntly, I believe that people don't live in cramped up spaces because it is fun, but because they can't afford anything else.
More importantly, however, stopping immigration is questionable since the measure would constitute a highly paternalist approach to integration. It basically entails adopting the principle that certain people in society (namely immigrants) don't have the freedom of movement that everybody else has. That is, if anything, highly disempowering. If there already is a siege-mentality (and the article certainly suggests this), then it will only be strengthed by such quite draconic measures, further fuelling frustration and antagonistic us vs. them feelings.
It seems to me that in a situation where disempowerment and social exclusion is so prevalent, such paternalist measures will only make things worse.
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